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Conflicts between U.S. and Latin American courts over tort
litigation now extend to the enforcement of foreign judgments. For
some time, friction has arisen because tort cases filed in U.S.
courts by non-U.S. plaintiffs against U.S. multi-national corporations have been regularly, and (some would say) unfairly, dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens (FNC).' These
dismissals have come where the court actually had jurisdiction,
but nevertheless dismissed the case. 2 They have come under circumstances in which a similar suit by a U.S. plaintiff would have
been transferred to another court in the U.S. A number of Latin
American nations have reacted with laws designed either to force
U.S. courts to retain the litigation, or more significantly, to result
in large American-style judgments in their own courts.3 Some
Latin American plaintiffs, therefore, have concluded that it may
be preferable to litigate at home and then seek enforcement of the
judgment in the United States. Latin American plaintiffs who
have won, and others who are expected to win 4 very large judgments at home against U.S. corporations doing business in Latin
America, however, cannot assume necessarily that those judgments will be recognized and enforced by U.S. courts.
The battles over FNC and now the enforcement of foreign tort
judgments expose an escalating international conflict being waged
in U.S. and foreign courts over jurisdiction and choice of law. This
article argues that the rise in some countries of discriminatory
1. See generally Gerardo Trejos Salas, Proposal for an Inter-American
Convention on the Effects and Treatment of the Forum Non Conveniens Theory: Forum
Non Conveniens and the Hague Convention. Latin American Position, in ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL COMMITTEE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 68

(2000), available at www.oas.org/cji/eng/INFOANUAL.CJI.2000.ING.pdf [hereinafter
OAS Report].
2. See discussion infra Parts I(A) and I(B)..
3. See infra text accompanying notes 22-33.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 60-64. In the Miami case referred to in
footnote 53, a trial court in Chinandega, Nicaragua, awarded the plaintiffs
approximately $97 million against Dole Foods and Dow, with the average award at
approximately $647,000 per plaintiff. In "HerreraRios v. Standard Fruit Co., the
same trial judge awarded 1,248 plaintiffs over $800 million, an average recovery of
approximately $648,000 per plaintiff." Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307,
1312-13 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
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laws and politicized-not simply corrupt-courts should cause the
U.S. Congress and the federal courts to consider the causes of this
brewing crisis. In the view of the authors, this growing international conflict over tort litigation is rooted in the abandonment of
sovereignty-based principles of jurisdiction and choice of law by
U.S. courts which has spread domestic forum-shopping to international tort litigation. The argument of the paper proceeds as follows: Part I describes the conflict; Part II analyzes the causes of
the conflict; and Part III discusses the choice between litigating
the merits of foreign tort claims and enforcing foreign tort
judgments.

I.

THE CONFLICT: AN OVERVIEW

International tort cases rarely rate notice by the U.S. public
or the media. Tort cases from Nicaragua and Ecuador, however,
have gained a good bit of media attention in the United States.'
The media and the parties recognize that these cases represent an
emerging trend, the attempt to enforce Latin American judgments
in U.S. courts.6 Corporate defendants in the U.S use the media to
politicize the foreign courts in which their cases were litigated.7
These corporate defendants purport that the courts in Nicaragua
and Ecuador have denied them due process. In a certain sense,
these countries are emulating - while exceeding - some of the
worst features of tort litigation in the United States.
A.

InitiatingLitigation in the United States

The general pattern in tort suits from Latin America has been
for the plaintiffs to sue U.S. corporations in the United States
where state and federal courts routinely dismiss the cases on the
basis of forum non conveniens (FNC), i.e. an inconvenient forum.8
At the urging of corporate defendants and with the U.S. Supreme
Court's approval, federal courts have applied FNC differently to
foreign litigation. In Piper Aircraft v. Reyno,9 the Court held that
when a foreign plaintiff sues a U.S. defendant, a U.S. forum is
5. See, e.g., Michael Orey, Big Penalties Loom for Chevron in Ecuador,
BUSINESSWEEK

(Aug.

24,

2009),

http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/

content/aug2009/db20090824_670278.htm.
6. See infra the introduction to Part III.
7. See, e.g., Mercedes Alvaro, Corporate News: Judge in Chevron Case Agrees to
Step Aside, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 125208172990

086901.html.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1996). See infra text accompanying notes 135-137.
9. See generally Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
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both reasonable and convenient. As a result of Piper Aircraft,
lower court dismissals of foreign plaintiffs for FNC have been
"substantial in number."' ° Until recently, the dismissed plaintiffs
and their attorneys have usually abandoned the litigation due to
the reduced prospects for a sizable judgment in the home
country."
Some lower federal courts have said, and may believe that
they are doing so as a matter of comity, or respect for foreign countries.12 Those countries have not viewed the dismissals as gestures
of respect, but have protested and retaliated against them. 3 The
purpose of most of the legislation has been to persuade U.S. courts
to retain jurisdiction. 4 The legislature has passed law in an
attempt to block the re-filing of litigation that was dismissed in
the U.S. on the grounds of FNC. In addition, new laws in Nicara-5
gua and Ecuador have made it more attractive to sue at home.
The new laws 6 in Nicrargua and Ecuador, discussed in this article, do not follow the normal trajectory. Instead, the laws have
resulted in favorable judgments from litigants filing suit in the
countries in which the alleged torts occurred. Only the Ecuadoran
case started in the United States. When that case was dismissed
by a U.S. court, however, the plaintiffs re-filed in Ecuador with
the expectation of winning an enormous judgment 7 (the fact that
the outcome appears fait accompli is a major matter of concern).'"
The changing landscape in international tort litigation prompted
a BusinessWeek article to observe that "[a]n Ecuadoran judge's
ruling in an environmental case [against Chevron] may make U.S.
companies rethink the strategy of pushing lawsuits into overseas
10. EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 496 n.6 (4th ed. 2004).
11. See Orey, supra note 5.
12. In the dispute between Ecuadoran plaintiffs and Texaco, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit and the district court did give serious consideration to
the views of the Ecuadoran government and to which views changed with a change of
government in an attempt to respect international comity. See Jota v. Texaco, Inc.,
157 F.3d 153, 159-61 (2d Cir. 1998).
13. See generally Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and
Blocking Statutes, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 21, 45 (2003-2004) ("The issue of
FNC is probably the thorniest one dividing the Civil and the Common Law legal
systems.").
14. Hal S. Scott, What to Do About ForeignDiscriminatoryForum Non Conveniens
Legislation, 49 IARV. INT'L L.J. 95, 99 (2009).
15. See generally infra Part I(A).
16. See infra notes 29-31.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 44-47 and 60.
18. See Orey, supra note 5.
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courts." 9
Regardless of whether the Chevron case does persuade U.S.
corporations to prefer U.S. courts, Latin American governments
insist that foreign plaintiffs have a right to litigate their claims
against U.S. corporations in U.S. courts. 20 Assisted by U.S. lawyers, Latin American and Caribbean countries have enacted
"blocking statutes"21 designed to show that no other court is available to the foreign plaintiff who first files in a U.S. court.22 In other
words, an FNC dismissal requires the availability of another
court. Plaintiffs contend that dismissal for FNC is inappropriate
because the courts in the foreign country became unavailable once
the case was filed in the U.S. 23 Such "blocking statutes" would

seem only to harm a country's own nationals by denying them any
forum if the U.S. courts do not accept the argument that no other
court is "available."24 Besides "blocking legislation," there has
been a debate about whether Latin American courts otherwise
provide an available and adequate forum. 25 The hope that these

"blocking statutes" will persuade U.S. courts not to dismiss the
litigation seems misplaced.26
Nicaragua and Ecuador have gone further by enacting a second, different type of "blocking statute," which changes national
law to the advantage of plaintiffs. Nicaragua's Special Law 364,27
according to that country's Supreme Court of Justice, is based on
the "Principle of Equality" and is intended to benefit plaintiffs by
19. Id.
20. See OAS Report supra note 1, at 69.
21. See Scott, supra note 14, at 95.
22. See Dahl, supra note 13, at 21; but see Scott, supra note 14, at 96.
23. See Dahl, supra note 13, at 35-36.
24. Dante Figueroa, Conflicts of JurisdictionBetween the United States and Latin
America in the Context of Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 119, 152-153 (2005-2006) ("[Ilnformal surveys show that claims rejected in the
U.S. under FNC have not, in general, been tried elsewhere.") (footnote omitted); see
also Scott, supra note 14, at 99 (discussing a second type of blocking statute or
discriminatory forum non conveniens legislation which may increase suits by foreign

plaintiffs in their domestic courts because they grant advantages to plaintiffs in suits
against American corporations, e.g., the statutes discussed herein for Nicaragua and
Ecuador).
25. See Dahl, supra note 13; see also Michael Wallace Gordon, Forum Non
Conveniens: A Response to Henry Saint Dahl, 38 U. MLAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 141

(2006-2007) (discussing whether plaintiffs litigating in the United States, over Latin
America, meant that plaintiffs with claims against U.S. corporations do not have an
available forum abroad).
26. See Winston Anderson, Forum Non Conveniens Checkmated? - The Emergence
of Retaliatory Legislation, 10 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 183 (2001).
27. See infra note 29.
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providing "procedural advantages" to historically socioeconomically disadvantaged plaintiffs in order to "level the litigation playing field."28 Conversely, respected Latin American scholar
Alejandro Garro has explained that statutes such as those enacted
in Nicaragua 29 and Ecuador " (as well as Guatemala31 ) are apparently "not only unnecessary but also counterproductive. Several
provisions are patently unconstitutional and others appear highly
questionable."32 Even without the retaliatory, "counterproductive,"
and (in part) "patently unconstitutional" legislation, Garro says,
civil-law principles of jurisdiction of most Latin American countries require those courts to refuse jurisdiction over the re-filed
cases.3 3 In other words, the actual source of the conflict seems to
lie in the differences between civil law and common law doctrines
of jurisdiction.
As reflected in a report of the Organization of American
States,34 inter-American conflict over different doctrines of jurisdiction is serious. Latin American law rejects the notion that a
court having jurisdiction can decline to exercise it, which is what
FNC permits. Despite FNC and limited abstention doctrines, the
classic understanding of U.S. federal courts' jurisdiction is basically the same. 6 Indeed, the routine application of FNC to dismiss
28. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1317 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
29. In 2000, Nicaragua passed Special Law 364 to be applied to banana workers
who were affected by pesticides. See an English translation of passages of the law in
Alejandro M. Garro, Forum Non Conveniens: 'Availability'and 'Adequacy' of Latin
American Forafrom a ComparativePerspective, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 65, 81
(2003-2004).
30. In 1998, Ecuador enacted a law for the interpretation of articles 27-30 of its
Code of Civil Procedure. That law is also referred to as Law 55. See the Spanish text
of the law available in HENRY S. DAHL, DAHL's LAW DICTIONARY: SPANIsH-ENGLISHI
ENGLISH-SPANISH 671 (3d ed. 1999).
31. In 1997, Guatemala enacted decree 34-97 for the protection of procedural
rights of nationals and residents. See the Spanish text available at http://www.
congreso.gob.gt/archivos/decretos/1997/gtdcx34-97.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
32. Garro, supra note 29, at 78. Nicaragua's Attorney General also rendered a
legal opinion stating that Special Law 364 violates Nicaragua's constitution. The
Supreme Court of Justice disagreed, however, because the defendants had the option
of opting out and having the case heard in the U.S. See Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at
1318-25.
33. Garro, supra note 29, at 65-78.
34. See OAS Report, supra note 1.
35. Id. See also STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY & THOMAS 0. MAIN, TRANSNATIONAL
LITIGATION IN CoMPARATrVE PERSPECTIVE 175 (2010) ("[Clivil law countries long ago
rejected the notion of forum non conveniens dismissals.").
36. Compare Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821) ("We have no more right
to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not
given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.") and MARTIN H.
REDISH,

THE

FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AND
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foreign litigation conflicts with the principle that federal courts
must exercise their jurisdiction, which includes cases between
U.S. citizens and foreign nationals. Although foreign plaintiffs
and their lawyers may simply care about the litigating advantages
in U.S. courts, many Latin American jurists believe that U.S.
courts lack respect for the jurisdictional limits of Latin American
courts. Latin American jurists, however, should understand that
U.S. federal courts regularly fail to respect the jurisdiction of
states in the U.S. and the constitutional limits on their own jurisdiction. As explained in the rest of this article, FNC dismissals of
foreign litigation are due not to intentional judicial discrimination
against foreign plaintiffs, but to judicial distortion of principles of
jurisdiction and conflicts of law.
In this clash of legal cultures, inter-American tort litigation
has become quite protracted. After initially filing in the United
States, a foreign tort case (usually for product liability) will most
likely be dismissed pursuant to FNC. That process can drag on for
many years, as demonstrated by the case of the Ecuadoran plaintiffs who sued Texaco in 1993 (the dismissal was affirmed on
appeal in 2002).11 If, thereafter, a court in Latin America refuses
to accept the re-filing, the Latin American plaintiffs sometimes
attempt to return to U.S. courts. Meaning, litigation easily
becomes an extended ping-pong match between United States and
Latin American courts. 9 While advocates for plaintiffs and
AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 47-74 (1991) (arguing that the exercise of federal
jurisdiction conferred is mandatory and that declining to exercise it constitutes
illegitimate exercise in law-making), with David. L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U.L. REv. 543 (1985) (arguing that, despite Chief Justice
Marshall's statement in Cohens, federal courts do and should exercise principled
discretion).
37. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
38. See Delgado v. Shell Oil. Co., 322 F. Supp. 2d 798 (S.D. Tex. 2004); see also In
re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147, 1166 (5th Cir. 1987) (en
banc), vacated on other grounds sub nom; Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Lopez,
490 U.S. 1032, (1989), opinion reinstatedon othergrounds, 883 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1989)
(stating that within the Fifth Circuit, an FNC dismissal must be conditional, meaning
that the district court must finally ensure that a plaintiff can reinstate his suit in the
alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice and that if the defendant
obstructs such reinstatement in the alternative forum that the plaintiff may return to
the American forum).
39. See Gilles Cuniberti, Preemptive JurisdictionTrumps Forum Non Conveniens
in Panama, CONFLICT OF LAws (Mar. 19, 2009), http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/
preemptive-jurisdiction-trumps-forum-non-conveniens-in-panama. This work reports
on a case in which Panamanian plaintiffs first filed in Missouri where the case was
dismissed on FNC. They re-filed in Panama where the case was dismissed on grounds
of preemptive jurisdiction. They then moved to reinstate in Missouri, where the
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defendants debate the requirement of "availability" and "adequacy" of the foreign courts and other aspects of FNC, 4° what is
lacking is an understanding and mediation of the conflict between
U.S. and civil law principles of jurisdiction.
B.

Litigating in Latin America, Followed by
Judgment Enforcement in the United States

If U.S. courts were to recognize and enforce the judgments in
the cases from Nicaragua and Ecuador, the disputes over the doctrine of FNC would likely become moot. While retaliatory legislation originally focused on forcing cases to be tried in U.S. courts,
the Nicaraguan and Ecuadoran laws made it more attractive to
litigate locally due to significant changes to specific kinds of
domestic litigation against U.S. companies. Nicaragua's Special
Law 36441 attempted to "encourage" defendants to prefer litigation
in the U.S. by requiring a high surety bond to defend the litigation
in Nicaraguan courts and setting a minimum amount of compensation ranging between $20,000 and $100,000 per injured plaintiff.42 After filing suit in Nicaragua, Dole and the other defendants
argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim, but
they were unsuccessful. In Osorio v. Dole Food Co, a federal court
in Miami refused to recognize the Nicaraguan judgment because
Special Law 364 "operates by establishing onerous conditions
under which defendants would litigate and then providing the
defendants with the right to opt out of Nicaragua's jurisdiction."43
The Chevron-Texaco litigation, which the company inherited
when it purchased Texaco in 2001, originated in 1993 when plaintiffs filed suit in a New York federal court." After several trips to
the Second Circuit, the case was finally dismissed in 2002 on the
grounds of FNC. The court qualified its dismissal on the condition
that Texaco agree to personal jurisdiction in Ecuador. The court
also required that Texaco waive its statute of limitation defense.45
During the Chevron-Texaco case, Ecuador enacted a blocking statmotion was denied again on FNC grounds. For a second time, plaintiffs re-filed in
Panama where the case was again dismissed based on preemptive jurisdiction.
40. See Dahl, supra note 13; but see Gordon, supra note 25.
41. See Dahl, supra note 13, at 50-53 for an English translation of Nicaraguan
Special Law 364.
42. Garro, supra note 29, at 81 nn.41-42.
43. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
44. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 627-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing
case on grounds of forum non conveniens and international comity).
45. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
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ute.46 Ecuador's Supreme Court, however, declared the blocking
statute unconstitutional in 2002. 47
Like the Nicaraguan litigation, the Chevron litigation
depended on legislation more radical than a simple blocking statute. When Chevron-Texaco filed a motion in federal court to dismiss on the grounds of FNC, the executive branch of the
Ecuadoran government supported the motion." The executive
branch had already entered into a 1995 settlement and then a
1998 release with Texaco, following termination of the company's
Ecuadoran operations in 1992. Despite these developments, in
1999, the government enacted the Environmental Management
Act 49 (EMA), which granted individuals "collective environmental
rights. '5' The law was obviously designed to circumvent the previous settlement with and release of Texaco. When the litigation
was re-filed in 2003 against Texaco, along with Chevron, the
plaintiffs retroactively asserted these newly created rights. 1
The Nicaraguan and Ecuadoran cases have turned the tables
on U.S. corporations. At the front end of litigation, U.S. corporations have been successful (maybe too successful) "pushing lawsuits into overseas courts" through FNC. 2 The Nicaraguan and
Ecuadoran plaintiffs, however, actually did litigate at home.
When they come to U.S. courts at the back end of litigation, the
plaintiffs have established their claims as reflected in final judgments. 3 The eventual enforcement of a foreign judgment was
always a possibility implicit in the dismissals for FNC, but that
result rarely occurred. 4
46. See Dahl, supra note 13, at 22.
47. See id. at 23.
48. See Orey, supra note 5 ("[T]he Ecuadoran government signed off on the
cleanup and released [Chevron] from future claims.").
49. See Law 37-1999 (Ley n0 37/1999, de Gesti6n Ambiental; RO 245, 30 de Julio
de 1999), available at http://www.miliarium.com/paginas/leyes/internacionalV
Ecuador/General/L37-99.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
50. Id. See Derechos Ambientales Colectivos in glossary of definitions. According to
the glossary, the collective environmental rights pertain to the enjoyment of a healthy
environment, free of pollution, and shared by the community.
51. See Maria Aguinda y Otros vs. ChevronTexaco Corporation Juicio No. 0022003, Corte Superior de Justicia, Nueva Loja, Ecuador.
52. See supra text accompanying note 4.
53. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
54. See Winston Anderson, Forum Non Conveniens Checkmated? - The Emergence
of Retaliatory Legislation, 10 J. TRANSNAT'L. L. & POL'Y 183, 184 (2000) (discussing
developments after the FNC dismissal of 26,000 plaintiffs in Delgado v. Shell Oil, 890
F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex. 1995)) ("[Tihousands of suits... filed in hundreds of courts
across the twenty-three affected foreign countries . . . mired in wrangling over
procedural and evidential matters [ended in] a settlement [in which] the plaintiffs
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A corporate defendant finds itself in a more precarious position when given a final foreign judgment than when attempting to
dismiss litigation on the grounds of FNC. Foreign judgments have
become much more easily enforceable in U.S. courts in recent
years. Moreover, if the corporation pushed the case out of an U.S.
court on FNC, as did Texaco, it now has to contradict its previous
argument. In a motion for dismissal on FNC, defendants must
persuade a United States court that a foreign forum is available,
adequate, and more convenient for handling the litigation." Having previously praised the appropriateness of the Ecuadoran
courts, Texaco with Chevron (which was separately sued) is now
arguing in great detail that the Ecuadoran court has failed to
administer due process. 6
Osorio, however, demonstrates that foreign judgments from
politicized courts are vulnerable to attack. In Osorio, the district
court held "the judgment in this case did not arise out of proceedings that comported with the international concept of due process." Furthermore, Nicaraguan law "stripped [defendants of
their basic right in any adversarial proceeding to produce evidence
in their favor and rebut the plaintiffs' claims," and Nicaragua's
"political strongmen exert their control over a weak and corrupt
judiciary." 7 The federal district court agreed with Dole and Dow's
argument that the Nicaraguan courts were an acceptable alternative forum. They argued that this fact should not be held against
them now due to the post hoc enactment of a discriminatory law
on which the judgment was based. 8
The Nicaraguan and Ecuadoran cases at issue became viable
only after those countries enacted legislation that de facto guaranreceived only a fraction of what they could have reasonably anticipated . . .in the
United States.") (footnote omitted).
55. See Garro, supra note 29.
56. See Daniel Fisher, Chevron's $27 Billion Problem, FORBES (July 13, 2009),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0713/texaco-ecuador-pollution-chevrons-27-billionproblem.html.
57. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1351-52.
58. Id. at 1344. The plaintiffs argued that Dole and Dow were estopped from
challenging the Nicaraguan judgment. The court held that the defendants' position is
not inconsistent with its previous position because at the time Special Law 364 did
not exist and it "fundamentally altered the legal landscape in Nicaragua." The Court
stated that "[it] rejects plaintiffs' contention that defendants' position here, arguing
that Nicaragua is an inadequate forum, is inconsistent with their earlier position
because in 1995 no one could have predicted that Nicaragua's legislature would pass,
and Nicaragua's courts would implement, Special Law 364, a law which, as
acknowledged by the Nicaraguan Supreme Court, singles out the DBCP defendants
for 'Positive Discrimination.'"
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tees the denial of due process. The Nicaraguan case and the ruling
of the Miami federal court are particularly important. As a supporter of the original judgment in Nicaragua has said, the case is
"one of the most important international ones litigated in Latin
America."59 If the Miami district court's decision stands and also
persuades courts elsewhere in the U.S., that should benefit Chevron and other U.S. corporations sued abroad and also discourage
further legislation and litigation in Latin America which denies
due process to corporate defendants.
The expected judgment against Texaco and Chevron for as
much as $27 billion would dwarf the size of the Nicaraguan judgment of $97 million. ° Chevron has said that it expects to lose in
the Ecuadoran court and will resist enforcement of the judgment
in the U.S. 61 Chevron appeared to have delayed the process by
embarrassing the most recent judge to handle the case into volunteering to recuse himself.6 2 The judge offered his recusal after the
company publicized a videotape purportedly showing the judge
telling others he would find the company liable. Even a change of
judges is unlikely to affect the final judgment if, as the company
contends, political pressure from the country's president and other
officials has corrupted the judicial process. To avoid the expected
judgment, Chevron has since filed an arbitration claim against
Ecuador in the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague.64
The decisions of Texaco-Chevron and other companies to
invoke FNC, only to face enormous foreign judgments, has been
described as "a self-inflicted injury."65 Even before enactment of
laws that patently deny due process in Nicaraguan and
Ecuadoran courts, courts in those countries were known to be corrupt, as discussed below.66 After the enactment of Special Law
59. Diego Fernandez Arroyo, Notes on NicaraguanLitigation:A Judgment Issued
Under Law 364, 5 INTER-AM. B. ASS'N L. REV. (2007).
60. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1312.
61. See Braden Reddall, Chevron Takes Ecuador Fight to Trade Arbitrators,
REUTERS (Sept. 23, 2009), www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSTRE58M7
5020090923. In a separate arbitration, regarding contract disputes between ChevronTexaco and Ecuador, the oil company won a partial award. Chevron Corp. v. Rep. of
Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Partial Award on the Merits (U.N. Comm'n on Int'l
Trade L. 2010), http://www.arbitration.fr/resources/PCA-No-2009-23.pdf.
62. See Gonzalo Solano, Court Replaces Judge in Chevron Pollution Case,
BUSINESS WEEK (Sept. 29, 2009), http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/chevron
program/chevroninthenews/6324.html.
63. Alvaro, supra note 7.
64. Solano, supra note 62.
65. See Fisher, supra note 56.
66. See generally infra Part I(C).
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364, Dole and Dow did resist litigating in Nicaragua by challenging the jurisdiction of its courts." Also Chevron, sued as a separate entity, has challenged the jurisdiction of the Ecuadoran
courts, to which only Texaco agreed to submit as a condition for
the court granting FNC.8 As discussed below, a judgment-defendants' evidence that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction and/or
denied it due process are critical to the issue of recognizing and
enforcing the foreign judgment. 9 Even if they have jurisdiction,
the courts of Nicaragua and Ecuador cannot provide due process
in cases involving discriminatory laws and political interference.
The consolidation of all government power in Nicaragua with the
election of Daniel Ortega as President7 1 and in Ecuador with the
election of President Rafael Correa Delgado 2 has included domination of each nation's judiciary.7 3
If U.S. courts were to enforce any of the judgments from Nicaragua or the expected one from Ecuador involving these special
laws, which deny due process, the inter-American and global consequences could be serious. Other countries might be motivated to
follow the examples of Nicaragua and Ecuador and forget simple
"blocking statutes" in favor of similar statutes enacting radical
changes in substantive and procedural law applicable only to U.S.
corporate defendants. Even in the absence of statutes that clearly
violate due process, other countries should pay heed to the fact
that one of several reasons Osorio refused recognition of the judgment was the finding - based on the conclusion of the U.S. State
Department and defense experts - that Nicaragua lacks an impartial judicial system.74

67. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1313 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
68. See Aguinda v. Texaco, 303 F.3d 470, 475 (2d Cir. 2002).
69. See generally infra Part 1(A).
70. See generally infra Part I(C) and text accompanying note 86.
71. See http://www.miliarium.com/paginas/leyes/internacional/Ecuador/General/
L37-99.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
72. See Ecuador Swears in New President, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/6262555.stm (last visited Mar. 10, 2010) (discussing the appointment of
President Rafael Correa Delgado); see also http://www.presidencia.gov.ec/articulo.
php?ar codigo=186&ca.codigo=l&ca.padre=O&tipo=1 (last visited Mar. 10, 2010)
(discussing President Correa Delgado's political career).
73. See Roger F. Noriega, Nicaragua: Daniel Ortega Nuevamente al Poder, Ai
OUTLOOK SERIES (Nov. 5, 2006), http://www.aei.org/outlook/25077; see also Hal
Weitzman, Rafael Correa: Chavista with a Whip Hand, FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 9,
2006), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/23a5e4fa-5732-lldb-9110-0000779e2340.html.
74. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1347-52 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
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C. Judicial Corruption
Many of Latin America's judiciaries have long had reputations among their own citizens as corrupt and subject to political
influence."5 This situation is well-summarized in the following
excerpt from The Global CorruptionReport, 2007:
When Latin America's most recent judicial reform movement began in the 1980s, one complaint directed at courts
and judges was corruption. Many citizens believed, rightly
or wrongly, that judges sold their decisions or traded them
against future favors from those with influence over their
careers. They believed that 'free' justice came with a price
tag. Other complaints may have been more frequently cited
such as political intervention, the failure to protect basic
human rights and outright collusion with authoritarian
governments, but these issues also often related to corruption. For instance, where governments intervened in the
judicial selection process, judges were chosen for their partisan connections or 'flexibility,' rather than on merit, and
therefore they started their careers with little reason to
suspect that honest conduct mattered in furthering their
careers. Lack of secure tenure (even in systems with formal
judicial careers) put additional pressures on judges and
encouraged them to act opportunistically during their
unpredictable stay in office.76
Generalizations for a whole region, however, fail to do justice
to particular countries. At one end, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay77 have reputations for relatively honest judiciaries. At the
other end, Nicaragua and Ecuador rank among the judiciaries
with the most corruption." They are among a group of countries
where corruption has worsened as populist regimes politicized the
judiciaries.7 9
75. See, e.g., Linn Hammergren, Fifteen Years of Judicial Reform in Latin
America: Where We Are and Why We Haven't Made More Progress,http://www.undp-

pogar.org/publications/judiciary/linn2/challenge.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
76. Linn Hammergren, FightingJudicial Corruption:A ComparativePerspective
from Latin America, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007: CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL
SYSTEMS 138 (2007), available at www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2007
[hereinafter GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007].

77. Id. at 144.
78. Id. at 329. In the CorruptionPerceptionsIndex 2006, Nicaragua ranks 111 and

Ecuador ranks 138 out of 163 nations.
79. See id. at 139. "he

state of judicial corruption had earlier origins and was

exacerbated under the authoritarian regimes of the 1970s and 1980s, but the
subsequent democratic opening did not necessarily resolve it; rather, in some cases,
the flourishing of democracy actually aggravated it. Incoming elected regimes often
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Disregard for the Rule of Law by a politicized judiciary is not
limited to Latin America, of course. Much of what is written in
this section could be applied to litigation originating in any country where the courts are politically corrupted.8 ° It could also apply
to non-tort ligation and to non-corporate U.S. defendants. As a
practical matter, tort litigation against U.S. multinational corporations holds great potential for lucrative payoffs through judicial
corruption and politicization. Unfortunately, a number of foreign
countries are emulating, in a corrupted form, isolated aspects of
the U.S. judicial system, for example, politicized judicial review,81
or as discussed herein, plaintiff-biased tort litigation. They would
better promote liberty, the interests of their people, and economic
development, as well as reduce corruption, by establishing a politically independent judiciary through a constitutional structure of
separation of powers.
1.

Judicial Corruption in Nicaragua

In 1995, litigation by Nicaraguan banana plantation workers
against Dow for alleged injuries caused by a pesticide was dismissed in the U.S. on grounds of FNC.8 2 In 2004, as part of a "second waive" reaction against FNC dismissals, Nicaragua retaliated
by enacting Special Law 364, which sets a high surety bond in
order to defend a case covered by the statute. This statute imposes
replaced a large portion of the bench, disregarding constitutional or due process
niceties, and sometimes with judges selected for their partisan leanings. New, massbased parties seeking ways to attract followers sometimes treated the courts as
just another place for patronage appointees. Greater independence for otherwise
unreformed judiciaries led to the creation of internal mafias, resulting in lessened
independence for lower-level judges. In several countries, members of high courts or
councils divided up the remaining judgeships so that each could name his or her allies
and protdgds to lower positions. With the emergence of organized, often drug-based,
crime, these internal mafias were occasionally infiltrated by criminal elements.
Judges also fell victim to the law of plomo o plata ('lead or silver') when insufficient
protection left them exposed to physical threats. Finally, as courts began to exercise
more political weight and to check unconstitutional programs and policies (or became
more active in trying corruption cases), the stakes were raised and a new round of
handpicked justices appeared. In Peru, Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay,
and Bolivia, national presidents forced out justices or entire Supreme Courts, or
provoked mass firings of the bench, often using corruption as a pretext, but reputedly
out of a desire to protect their personal and political interests. In short, democracy
made the judiciary more important, but it also increased the motives and means for
corrupting judges."
80. See generally GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 76.
81. See generally ROBERT BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF
JUDGES (2003).
82. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
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a non-rebuttable presumption of causation once sterility is established, and allows a level of damages commensurate with the foreign legal system with which the case is connected, i.e. the United
States. s3 The law has been hailed by an admirer as "the normal
consequence of the blocking of U.S. courts by forum non conveniens [that] revolutionized Nicaraguan law bringing it closer to
U.S. law."'
As noted in the opening footnote, Professor Baker has some
familiarity with matters related to the Nicaraguan judiciary. As a
consultant to USAID in 2004,"5 he wrote a report on the Nicaraguan judiciary (as well as reports about other Central American
judiciaries) as part of a project assessing the commercial law environment in Central America. At that time, the corruption of the
Nicaraguan judiciary and the enactment of Special Law 364 concerned U.S. officials. In part, that report for USAID in 2004 stated
the following about the Nicaraguan judiciary:
1. Introduction
The fact that USAID has terminated all funding to the
Nicaragua judiciary and the Agency's in-country Mission
Director, James Vermillion, has prevented all contact by
official visitors with the Nicaraguan Supreme Court,
[which] reflects the depth of the judicial crisis in Nicaragua. Mr. Vermillion has been very blunt, as quoted in The
Miami Herald (June 18, 2004): 'It became clear the decisions of some judges were being politically manipulated.
There is a widespread perception that justice is for sale.'
During our visit, the judicial crisis was the subject of
front-page coverage and a planned address by President
Bolafios, which was ultimately cancelled.
Seeing all this, any foreign business considering
investment in Nicaragua would be justifiably deterred.
Without a drastic change in the judiciary, the only safeand still inadequate-option for resolving commercial disputes is arbitration.
3. Implementing Institutions
Seventy to eighty percent of the judges are current or
former members of the Sandinista party. The appointment
of many of these judges was reportedly achieved through
political favor, and few, if any, have adequate qualifications
83. Id. at 1314-15.
84. See Arroyo, supra note 59.
85. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not of USAID.
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to serve as judges."8
Since the 2004 report, the Sandinistas have consolidated their
control of the government, which at the time of the report was
strongest in the judiciary. 7 In other words, the politicization of
the judiciary has certainly not lessened. The Osorio case details
the corruption and politicizing of Nicaragua's courts, citing
reports from the State Department, other organizations, and
defense experts.88
2.

Judicial Corruption in Ecuador

Corruption and constitutional chaos go hand-in-hand in Ecuador. Since becoming a republic in 1830, Ecuador has had twenty
constitutions.89 That number is the fourth highest number in
Latin America, as well as in the world.9" It has been observed that
there is a correlation between numerous constitutions and political instability.9 Ecuador's rank as one of the most corrupt countries in the world is consistent with that hypothesis. In 2007, a
socialist government took power and produced the latest constitution, which took effect the following year.92 The current and previous governments, although ideologically quite opposed, politicized
the courts of Ecuador. Not long after President Correa took office
in 2007, the Human Rights Watch reported that "a Congressional
vote removing all nine judges of Ecuador's Constitutional Court is
the latest in a series of arbitrary actions by competing political
factions that have undermined the autonomy of the country's
democratic institutions."9 3
86. Declaration of John S. Baker, Jr., Ph.D at 3, Osorio v. Navarro, 665 F. Supp.
2d 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2009), No. 07-22693-CIV-HUCK, 2008 WL 6971768, adapted from
a previous report by John S. Baker. Jr., Ph.D, see Report on Nicaragua to USAID 2005
(on file with authors).
87. Id.
88. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
89. For the text of the constitutions, in Spanish, see Biblioteca Valenciana, http:l!
www.cervantesvirtual.com/portal/constituciones/pais.formato?pais=Ecuador&indice=
Constituciones (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
90. Jose Luis Cordeiro, Constitutions Around the World: A View from Latin
America, IDE DISCUSSION PAPER N. 164 (Inst. of Developing Economies, Japan) July
2008, at 11.
91. Id. at 28.
92. See the text of the Constitution of 2008, in Spanish, at Political Database of
the Americas, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador08.html
(last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
93. Ecuador: Removal of Judges Undermines Judicial Independence, HuMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (May 10, 2007), http'//www.hrw.orgen/news/2007/05/10/ecuadorremoval-judges-undermines-judicial-independence. "'Disagreement with a judicial
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The U.S. State Department makes the same point about the
rule of law in Ecuador, particularly as it affects businesses in civil
and commercial dispute resolution.
Systemic weakness and susceptibility to political or economic
pressures in the rule of law constitute the most important problem
faced by U.S. companies investing in or trading with Ecuador. The
Ecuadoran judicial system is hampered by processing delays,
unpredictable judgments in civil and commercial cases, inconsistent rulings, and limited access to the courts. Criminal complaints
and arrest warrants against foreign company officials have been
used to pressure companies involved in commercial disputes.
There have been cases in which foreign company officials have
been prevented by the courts from leaving Ecuador due to pending
claims against the company. Ecuadorians involved in business
decision cannot justify the summary removal of judges, especially those responsible
for Ecuador's Constitution,' said Josd Miguel Vivanco, America's director at Human
Rights Watch. Unfortunately this is only the latest example of Ecuadorian officials
seeking to resolve political differences by summarily removing their opponents from
their posts. A series of controversial decisions by Congress and the courts sparked a
political crisis in March after the Supreme Electoral Court (Tribunal Supremo
Electoral, or TSE) convoked a referendum to approve the election of a constituent
assembly to rewrite the Constitution. On March 6, fifty-two members of Ecuador's
100-member unicameral legislature, who opposed holding the referendum, replaced
the president of the TSE after the court had announced that the referendum would be
held on April 15. On the following day, the TSE retaliated by summarily firing fiftyseven lawmakers. Both decisions were without any credible basis in law. On April 23,
the Constitutional Court ruled that the firing of the legislators was unconstitutional
and ordered that most of them be reinstated. On the following day, all nine judges
were themselves removed by Congress. It is the third time in three years that
Congress has summarily removed judges from Ecuador's Constitutional Court. The
parliamentary resolution approved on April 24 argued that the court's four-year term
of office had expired. The court was appointed in February 2006 at a time when it had
been vacant for ten months following the dismissal in April 2005 of the previous
incumbents. The resolution argued that the judges' term on the bench had been
meant to expire in January 2007, when the previous incumbents' term would have
expired if they had remained in office. The motion was carried without discussion and
without the presence of the opposition. Under Article 275 of the Constitution, the
Constitutional Court is appointed by Congress for a four-year period. Nowhere in the
February 2006 resolution that appointed the judges does it state that their term of
office would be for a shorter period. Under Ecuadorian law, judges of the
Constitutional Court can only be removed by impeachment, a procedure that provides
guarantees of due process. Each effort by the different factions in Congress and by the
Supreme Electoral Court to remove officials from their posts has involved gross
interference in the autonomy of another branch of government, Human Rights Watch
said. Ecuador's democratic institutions have been in crisis for years. Three presidents
have been ousted since 1997 before completing their term. In December 2004, during
the presidency of Lucio Guti~rrez, Congress fired and replaced most of the judges of
the Supreme Court. The Constitutional Court was summarily fired in November
2004, and again in April 2005."
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disputes can sometimes arrange for their opponents, including foreigners, to be jailed pending resolution of the dispute.
The courts are often susceptible to outside pressure and
bribes. Neither Congressional oversight nor internal judicial
branch mechanisms have shown a consistent capacity to effectively investigate and discipline allegedly corrupt judges.
Despite efforts to depoliticize and modernize the court system, the resource-starved judiciary continues to operate slowly
and inefficiently. There are over 55,000 laws and regulations in
force. Many of these are conflicting, which contributes to unpredictable and sometimes contradictory judicial decisions. Enforcement of contract rights, equal treatment under the law, IPR
protection, and unpredictable regulatory regimes are major concerns for foreign investors.94
II.

CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT: U.S.-CREATED CHAOS OVER
JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF LAW

Unfortunately, countering the influence of politicized courts
in Nicaragua and Ecuador on other Latin American countries is
difficult when tort litigation in the U.S. is so dysfunctional. In particular as it relates to international tort litigation, an unexamined
extension of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on matters of
jurisdiction and choice of law has resulted in state law governing
matters affecting foreign affairs of the United States. The combined effect of the Supreme Court's approval of state long-arm
statutes, Erie Railroad v. Tompkins9 5 and Klaxon v. Stentor,9 6 has
been to open wide the door for not only interstate, but also international forum shopping. Allowing states to extend their jurisdiction beyond their borders and state judges to choose what law to
apply (usually the law of the forum state) has greatly increased
forum shopping. As a result, plaintiff-friendly states effectively set
the standards for interstate tort litigation. 97 Whatever justification there may be for allowing that situation to prevail in interstate litigation, those considerations cannot justify state law
governing international tort litigation. Although choice of law is
94. 2009 Investment Climate Statement - Ecuador,BUREAU OF ECONOMIC, ENERGY
BusiNEss AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Feb. 2009), http://www.state.gov/
e/eeb/rls/othr/icsI2009/117668.htm.
95. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
96. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
97. See generally, Michael W. McConnell, A Choice-of-Law Approach to ProductsLiability, 37 lNoc. AcAD. POL. ScI., 90-101 (1988).
AND
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normally considered a matter of private international law another term for Conflicts of Law - international tort litigation
raises considerations of foreign policy and public international
law, which are properly the responsibility of the federal
government.9"
Hamilton argued in FederalistNo. 3 that the interpretation of
not only treaties, but also the law of nations was committed "to
the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national government." 99 The framers of the U.S.
Constitution were concerned that ill-considered action by a state
could disrupt the nation's relationships with other countries, possibly causing war. Although irresponsible actions by states no
longer pose a threat of war, that circumstance has not eliminated
the role of federal courts in international litigation to guard
against unnecessary conflict with foreign nations. Ostensibly, the
primary concern of lower federal courts in international litigation
seems to be limiting their dockets by blocking litigation from foreign plaintiffs through the application of FNC.
As discussed in Part III, the very case law that is responsible
for the foreign, as well as interstate, forum shopping is now creating a much more significant challenge for federal courts with
respect to the enforcement of foreign judgments. For example,
interstate forum shopping and now foreign forum shopping results
from 1.) state long-arm statutes which allow an extra-territorial
exercise of judicial jurisdiction and 2.) requiring federal courts in
diversity cases to apply the judicial decisions, as well as the statutory law of the state where the federal court is located. If federal
courts continue to follow state legislation and judicial decisions in
the enforcement of foreign judgments, as generally they have been
doing, foreign litigants with a judgment in hand have many
choices of states where state and federal courts will readily
enforce those judgments.

98. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (declaring unconstitutional a state
statute governing the escheating of property of non-resident aliens because of the
intrusion by the state into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts
to the President and Congress). For a discussion of the issue of whether, and to what
extent, there is a federal common law related to foreign affairs, see RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 750-758 (5th ed. 2003).
99. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 11 (John Jay) (Liberty Fund ed., 2001).
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The Relationship of State Long-Arm Statutes and
FNC

The Supreme Court approved, subject to the Due Process
Clause, the extra-territorial extension of jurisdiction in order to
allow injured plaintiffs to sue at home against out-of-state corporate defendants. InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington' ° adopted
the "minimum contacts" test for judging a state's exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident. Two years later, the Court approved
the state-originated doctrine of FNC in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.01
Although FNC and "minimum contacts" are different, the two doctrines adopted similar factors related to the convenience of the
parties and the court.'02 InternationalShoe allowed states to enact
"long-arm" statutes, which asserted jurisdiction over an out-ofstate party, usually a corporation, as long as doing so did not violate traditional notions of "fair play" under the Due Process
Clause. 10 3 Such an expansion of jurisdiction favored plaintiffs, but
in some cases was very inconvenient or unfair to the defendant. So
this expansion of jurisdiction created a need to filter out cases that
did not, for various reasons, belong in the jurisdiction chosen by
the plaintiff. The Supreme Court's approval of FNC gave judges
discretion, but not on an arbitrary basis, to dismiss or transfer
cases despite the court's jurisdiction.0 4 Prior to International
Shoe's expansion of jurisdiction, courts simply would not have 0had
5
jurisdiction over many of the cases in which FNC is invoked.
Since InternationalShoe, a "plurality" of jurisdictional cases
in the Supreme Court has involved torts. 10 6 As a leading text on
Conflicts Law observes, "[t]he double effect of expanding boundaries of tort liability and in personamjurisdiction was bound to pro100. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
101. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
102. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 10, at 493.

103. Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 323-24 ("Due process does permit State courts to
enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred if it be found reasonable and just
according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice ... [aind
this in turn means that we will permit the State to act if upon an estimate of the
inconveniences which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its home
or principal place of business, we conclude that it is reasonable to subject it to suit in a
State where it is doing business.").
104. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 10, at 494.

105. Id. at 321 ("InternationalShoe's considerably more permissive test meant that
many jurisdictional assertions not permitted by the common law were now
constitutional.").
106. Id. at 360.
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duce factual and legal patterns unknown in any previous era."107
The broadening of liability, especially for manufacturers in product liability cases and an expansive view of "minimum contacts"
jurisdiction based on a product being put into "the stream of commerce," has meant that manufacturers and sellers of products face
a great deal of uncertainty as to the extent they are subject to the
jurisdiction of various states. 10 8 The Supreme Court has not settled what more than presence of a product is necessary to establish "stream of commerce" jurisdiction.0 9 Given the opportunity to
forum shop often among multiple jurisdictions, plaintiffs will want
to sue defendants in the state with the most favorable law. Even if
the defendant is able to remove the case from state to federal
court, under Erie and Klaxon, the federal judge must apply both
the substantive and conflicts law of the state. With the abandonment by state courts and legislatures of territorial-based conflicts
rules, in favor of various modern academic theories, the parties
can pretty much count on the court applying the law of the state in
which it is located.1 1 °
Although enforcement of foreign judgments is more fully discussed in the next section, consider the jurisdictional question in
the context of recognition and enforcement of judgments. When a
foreign plaintiff seeks to enforce a foreign judgment, the enforcing
court must refuse to do so if the foreign court lacked jurisdiction."'
But, how should it be determined whether the foreign court had
jurisdiction? Is jurisdiction to be determined, as it should be, at
least initially, by the jurisdictional bases recognized in the country where the case was litigated? If the foreign court asserted
jurisdiction on a basis not recognized by the nation in which the
enforcing court sits, that court may refuse to recognize the judgment because to do so would violate that country's public policy." 2
The comity accorded the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments has generally been subject to a defense that enforcing
107.
108.
109.
on the

Id. at 360-61.
See id. at 362-67.
See the plurality and other opinions in the Supreme Court's most recent case
issue, Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).

110. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 10, at 105-07.
111. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTs RECOGNITION ACT § 4(a)(1)-(2), 13 U.L.A.
263 (1962) ("A foreign judgment is not conclusive if... the foreign court did not have

personal jurisdiction over the defendant or the foreign court did not have jurisdiction
over the subject matter.").
112. Id. at § 4(b)(3) ("A foreign judgment need not be recognized if the [cause of
action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public
policy of this state.").
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the judgment would violate local public policy. 113
In a strange inversion that goes beyond comity, some U.S.
courts appear willing to find that the foreign court had jurisdiction under circumstances where the foreign government would not
normally assert jurisdiction. In Osorio, the federal court applied a
"minimum contacts" approach to determine whether the Nicaraguan court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants. 1 4 With
the possible exception of Nicaragua's Special Law 364, which retroactively targets these particular defendants, Nicaragua does not
assert jurisdiction based on "minimum contacts." Even if the foreign policy of the United States at the time did not require a boycott of the courts in Nicaragua, should a federal court allow
foreign countries to expand their jurisdiction into the United
States based on U.S. notions of jurisdiction generally rejected by
other countries? These are matters related to foreign policy,
which courts need to be cautious about disrupting."5
From a non-American point of view, the argument would be
that U.S. states have extended their jurisdiction abroad under the
"minimum contacts" test; therefore, other nations ought to be able
to extend their jurisdiction into the U.S. states, even though those
countries would not do so in relations with other nations. Whether
that approach is retaliatory and/or based on international reciprocity, the argument only highlights the mischief created by the
intrusion of states into matters that affect foreign affairs. Extraterritorial jurisdiction and a policy regarding the enforcement of
foreign-money judgments are matters to be determined by the federal government." 6
B.

Choice of Law in State and Federal Cases

State law remains the common thread connecting 1.) the
Supreme Court's "minimum contacts" approach to judicial jurisdiction; 2.) Erie and Klaxon; and 3.) FNC. While the Supreme
113. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 10, at 1333-36.
114. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., No. 07-22693-CIV, 2009 WL 48189, at *4-*14 (S.D.
Fla. Jan. 5, 2009).
115. See American Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401, 417 (2003) (holding
unconstitutional a California law requiring any insurer doing business in the state to
provide information about all policies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945 by the
company itself or any one related to it). The case relied substantially on Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), likewise finding the state law in question to be an
unconstitutional "intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the
Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress."
116. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 at 414 (citing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 42, 44, and
80 about the need for uniformity in matters of foreign affairs).
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Court utilizes the Due Process Clause to limit state long-arm statutes,11 the fact remains that states are permitted to exercise
extra-territorial jurisdiction. Long-arm statutes are necessary in a
federal system, but - as Professor Baker has written elsewhere Congress is the proper body to do so pursuant to the Constitution's
Full Faith and Credit Clause."' Erie and Klaxon require federal
courts to follow state statutes and the courts' jurisprudence in
diversity cases, but should those decisions apply to international
litigation? Although adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, the doctrine of FNC moved into federal courts from state court decisions
and applied originally to interstate litigation.'19
1.

Sovereignty and Comity in United States Courts

The dramatic changes in U.S. conflicts and tort law over the
last sixty years have been rooted in the disregard for logic and
contempt for form, which have characterized the reigning ideology
of legal realism. 2 ° As a result, in diversity cases, amorphous dueprocess and balancing tests have replaced doctrines about jurisdiction and the choice of law, which were corollaries to the principle of sovereignty. European countries modified, but did not
abandon the old rules while U.S. courts went through its legal117. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 10, § 5.4, pp. 292-95 (discussing Int'l Shoe v.
Washington, Hanson v. Dencla, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, and Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct.).
118. John S. Baker, Jr., Respecting a State's Tort Law, While Confining its Reach to
that State, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 698, 713 (2001).
119. See infra note 135.
120. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 78, 86-87 (1978). Legal realism
is a term applied to certain academic theorists writing in the 1930s. By 1940, legal
realism had triumphed in the law schools. "Karl Llewellyn, whom most people
regarded as the leading Realist, insisted throughout his life that there had never been
a Realist school or a Realist movement." Among other things, legal realists had in
common an opposition to "conceptualism" and they viewed that the law was more a
matter of experience rather than logic. See also SCOLES, supra note 10, at 22-25
(emphasis added). "The reaction against Beale was led by Walter Wheeler Cook and
his 'local law theory' which, at least in its underlying premises and orientation,
resembles much of the theories advocated in the last half of the twentieth century
.... Cook's main contribution to American conflicts law lies less in enunciating a new
theory and more in deconstructing the old one. Cook's attack on the traditional theory
was continued by Professor David F. Cavers, who at the time shared many of Cook's
legal realist convictions and the same skepticism towards generalizations. Cavers
would settle for nothing less than a complete reversal of the priorities of the choice of
law process. He argued for a transformation of the choice-of-law process from one of
choosing between states without regard to the way each state would wish to regulate
the multistate case at stake, to a process of choosing among the conflicting rules of
law in light of the result each rule would produce in the particular case."
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realist- inspired revolution.12 1 It may be impossible to clean-up the
intellectual and practical mess created by legal realism in matters
of domestic jurisdiction and choice of law, but it is still possible to
do so in international litigation.
According to the doctrine of sovereignty, one nation need not
recognize the law or judgments of any other nation or open its
courts to foreigners.122 But as long as there has been the doctrine
of absolute sovereignty, nations have generally allowed their
courts to recognize the law and judgments of other countries, at
least under certain circumstances. 123 The question naturally arises
how such a practice can be reconciled with the theory of exclusive
law-making by each sovereign. The answer, since the seventeenth
century, has been found in the doctrine of comity. Comity has been
"defined as something between mere courtesy and legal duty, as
derived from the tacit consent of nations and based on mutual forbearance and enlightened self-interest." 124 Comity, thus, rests on
the principle of reciprocity which is generally the basis for relations among sovereign nations.
The doctrine of comity appeared in U.S. cases as early as
1788, thereafter shaping conflicts jurisprudence. Comity became
the operational theory in U.S. courts from 1850 to 1900, and has
continued to receive mention in court decisions.'2 5 As scholars in
the field of Conflicts of Laws rightly recognize, the doctrine of comity "formed the cornerstone of [Supreme Court Justice Joseph]
Story's celebrated" 26 treatise on Conflicts and that "[t]he influence
of Story's work was profound, not only in the United States, but
also abroad."1 27 While treating Justice Story's work with respect as
121. See id. at 110-12.
122.

JOSEPH STORY,

DOMESTIC

COMMENTARIES

IN REGARD TO

CONTRACTS,

ON

THE

CONFLICT

OF

RIGHTS AND REMEDIES,

REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS,

LAWS,
AND

FOREIGN AND
ESPECIALLY IN

AND JUDGMENTS

§18-20, at

19-22 (Hilliard, Gray and Co., 1834).
123. Id. § 20-37 at 21-37.
124. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 10, at 14.
125. Id. at 18-20.
126. Id. at 15 (referring to STORY, supra note 122).
127. SCOLES, supra note 10, at 19. Argentine courts have looked at U.S. decisions
when solving local claims. In addition, the drafter of the Argentine Civil Code of 1871,
Dalmacio V6lez Sarsfield, made reference to the Commentaries on the Conflict of
Laws in his writings. References are not only included in the notes to fourteen articles
of his civil code, but also in the letter of transmission of Book I of the draft that Vdlez
sent to the minister Eduardo Costa on June 21, 1865. Most of the references that
Vlez did of the abovementioned work of Story are in the areas of conflict of laws,
especially focusing on capacity, form and effects of contracts, marriage, and
testaments. See generally, Agustin Parise, Legal Transplants and Codification:
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the first comprehensive treatise in English, these scholars consider Justice Story's general approach to Conflicts, based on the
doctrine of comity, an interesting but ephemeral phase in the historical improvement of Conflicts theory.12
Comity's successor, the "vested rights"1 29 doctrine, emerged

after 1900 and was prominent until the 1950s; it combined the
principle of territoriality 3 ' within its framework. Thus, until
1950, the sovereignty-based principle of territoriality was dominant in domestic conflicts law. As one would expect, legal realist
critics found the rules of the First Restatement of Conflicts based
on territoriality and vested rights "mechanical, rigid, and jurisdiction-selecting." 13 ' The abandonment of such rules undermined federalism during a period when federalism was generally being
eroded. In the U.S., this has resulted in a great deal of uncertainty, while in the rest of the world, especially in Europe, the
trend has been towards greater certainty and predictability." 2
Conflicts theorists spent years demolishing U.S. conflicts
rules based on the sovereignty principle of territoriality, without
much regard for the implications for international relations.
Whatever its faults, that system of territorial-based conflicts rules
produced predictability concerning jurisdiction and the choice of
law in diversity and international cases. Moreover, only a territorial approach conformed to the U.S. federal structure, as well as to
the law of nations. Unfortunately, since the U.S. Supreme Court
extended Erie to conflicts of law decisions in Klaxon, federal courts
have been obligated to follow state court decisions on interstate
choice of law issues. As a result, the U.S. approach to private
international law became dominated by the parochial viewpoint of
the states. That was a perverse development because the federal
courts were meant to maintain, in diversity and international
cases, neutrality and reciprocity as among the states and with
other nations."'
Exploring the North American Sources of the Civil Code of Argentina (1871), 2 JINDAL
GLOBAL LAw REVIEW 40 (2010).
128. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 10, at 18-68.

129. Id. at 18-22.
130. Id. at 20-21.
131. Id. at 21 (footnote omitted).
132. Id. at 110-11.
133. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 10 (John Jay) (Liberty Fund ed., 2001). "It is of high
importance to the peace of America, that she observe the law of nations towards all
these powers ....

Hence it will result, that the administration of the political

counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national government, will be more wise,
systematical and judicious, than those of the individual states, and consequently
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As previously mentioned, the Framers gave federal courts
jurisdiction over matters involving individual claims related to
foreign affairs in order to prevent state courts from causing foreign policy difficulties.1 4 By allowing the states to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction and to apply their own laws as they choose,
together with FNC, the federal courts have failed to carry out this
responsibility, as discussed further below.
2.

Jurisdiction: Comity or Forum Non Conveniens

The idea of forum non conveniens entered U.S. law through a
1929 law review article. 135 Derived from Scotland, England, and
some state cases, 36 the doctrine was a vague one, which allowed a
court to refuse to exercise jurisdiction under limited circumstances. The seminal law review article referred to the doctrine as
an exception applied in cases of hardship.1 37 In the U.S., the doctrine developed in response to domestic forum shopping, which
grew along with the spread of long-arm statutes directed at interstate corporations. Plaintiffs suing corporations in tort could
obtain jurisdiction not only where the corporation was licensed to
do business, but where the corporation had acted in a way that
created "minimum contacts" in a state.
more satisfactory with respect to the other nations, as well as more safe with respect
to ourselves."
134. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 412-13 (Alexander Hamilton) (Liberty Fund ed.,
2001). "[TIhe peace of the WHOLE ought not be left at the disposal of a PART. The
union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its
members. And the responsibility for an injury, ought ever to be accompanied with the
faculty of preventing it. As the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of
courts, is with reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow that the
federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other
countries are concerned .... The power of determining causes between two states,

between one state and the citizens of another, and between the citizens of different
states, is perhaps not less essential to the peace of the union, that that which has
been just examined."
135. See Edward L. Barrett, Jr., The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CAL. L.
REV. 380, 388 (1947) ("In 1929 a law review writer brought the term forum non
conveniens into American law."); see generally Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929).
136. See Barrett, supra note 135, at 386-88; see also Blair, supra note 135, at 2.
137. See Blair, supra note 135, at 2 (quoting an English treatise writer). "[Tihe
court will not hold its hand unless there be, in the circumstances of the case, such
hardship on the party setting up the plea as would amount to vexatiousness or
oppression if the court persisted in exercising jurisdiction. The inconvenience, then,
must amount to actual hardship, and this must be regarded as a condition sine qua
non of success in putting forward a defense of forum non convenielts. For the general
rule is that a court possessing jurisdiction must exercise it unless the reasons to the
contrary are clear and cogent."

2010]

CONFLICTS IN TORT LITIGATION

27

The application of FNC changed with the Supreme Court's
decision in Gilbert.138 At that time, the doctrine was accepted in
only six states while courts in other states had either rejected it or
not considered it. 139 In approving FNC in diversity cases, the

Court described the case as one "of those rather rare cases in
which the doctrine should be applied."

40

As between two domestic

parties, FNC's use did not exclude a case from jurisdiction in some
U.S. court; but it does generally result in a dismissal in international litigation.' Domestic use of FNC still gives a preference to
the plaintiffs choice and, when exercised, leaves the plaintiff with
an alternate forum to which the case may be transferred. In international litigation, as a result of Piper,' no presumption exists in
favor of the plaintiffs choice of forum.13 The court cannot transfer
the case to a foreign court but generally dismisses it on the premise that a court in the foreign nation is available.
It is clear from Justice Story's treatise on Conflicts that Piper
reversed well-established concepts of jurisdiction over suits by foreign plaintiffs. The common law of the United States and England
allowed foreign plaintiffs to sue in their courts.'" Suits on torts
and contracts were "personal actions" deemed to be "transitory."
Therefore, under principles of common law and international law,
such actions could be brought against a defendant where he was
found and served, appeared voluntarily, or consented to
138. See generally Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
139. Barrett, supra note 135, at 388-89.
140. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 509.
141. Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007)
('The common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens has continuing application in
federal courts only in cases where the alternative forum is abroad and perhaps in rare
instances where a state or territorial court serves litigational convenience best.").
142. See generally Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S 235 (1981).
143. Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 430 ("A defendant invoking forum non conveniens
ordinarily bears a heavy burden in opposing the plaintiffs chosen forum... [wihen
the plaintiffs choice is not its home forum, however, the presumption in the plaintiffs
favor applies with less force, for the assumption that the chosen forum is appropriate
is in such cases less reasonable.").
144. STORY, supra note 122, § 542, at 453. "There are nations, indeed, which wholly
refuse to take cognizance of controversies between foreigners, and remit them for
relief to their own domestic tribunals, or to that of the party defendant; and,
especially, as to matters originating in foreign countries. Thus, in France, with few
exceptions, the tribunals do not entertain jurisdiction of controversies between
foreigners respecting personal rights and interests. But this is a matter of mere
municipal policy and convenience, and does not result from any principles of
international law. In England, and America, on the other hand, suits are
maintainable, and are constantly maintained, between foreigners, where either of
them is within the territory of the State in which the suit is brought."

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1

jurisdiction. 145
Limiting the doctrine of FNC to those situations where U.S.
jurisdiction has expanded beyond traditional notions of jurisdiction would have beneficial effects in international litigation. If
U.S. courts applied FNC only to cases where the plaintiff sued the
defendant in a jurisdiction other than the defendant's domicile,
the doctrine would basically conform to traditional principles of
both common-law and civil-law jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction
where a defendant is domiciled or generally resides is a well-recognized principle. 4 6 Under this restricted approach to FNC, a foreign plaintiff would be able to sue the defendant, a United States
corporation, only where it had its domicile, i.e., either its state of
incorporation or principal place of business. 47 That would be consistent both with traditional common-law and civil-law principles
of jurisdiction.
Other traditional principles of jurisdiction would have
resulted in the federal court long ago dismissing the case against
Texaco for lack of jurisdiction, rather than for FNC, which is available only when a court has jurisdiction.' The claims against Texaco, and now also Chevron, allege not only personal injuries, but
also environmental injuries to land in Ecuador.'4 9 Under traditional, sovereignty-based principles of jurisdiction, the federal
courts should have dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the action would have been classified as a "mixed"
one. 5' Although alien-diversity jurisdiction between plaintiffs and
defendants exists, traditional principles of territorial jurisdiction
would not allow a court in one country to rule on matters involving
land in another country."' "Mixed" actions - those involving real
145. STORY, supra note 122, § 538, at 450 ("[I]n the common law, real and mixed
actions are local; and personal actions are transitory.")(footnote omitted); id. § 539, at
450 ("Considered in an international point of view, jurisdiction, to be rightly
exercised, must be founded either upon the person being in the territory, or the thing
being within the territory; for otherwise, there can be no sovereignty exerted . . . .
id. § 543, at 453-54.
146. See DAVID EPSTEIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO
JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND STRATEGY §6.04[3] at 6-22 - 6-23 (3d. ed. 2007).
147. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1186 (2010) (interpreting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (c)(1) the court held that principal place of business refers to the place where
the corporation's high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's

activities).
148. See generally Aguinda v. Texaco, No. 93-7527, 1994 WL 142006, at *13-*17
(S.D.N.Y Apr. 11, 2009).
149. Id. at *1.
150. See STORY, supra note 122, § 552, at 464-65.

151. Id. § 551, at 463-64 ("Even in countries acknowledging the civil law, it has
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property as well as personal claims - would have been proper only
in the place of the injury. 15 2 Like purely "real" actions, the involvement of real property is supposed to restrict jurisdiction to the
courts of the sovereign in whose territory the land is located. U.S.
Conflicts theorists5 3 have dropped "mixed," which does not mean
that U.S. courts can legitimately claim jurisdiction over an action
for damages to land in Ecuador."M Without jurisdiction, the U.S.
court would have had no basis for conditioning its dismissal on
Texaco submitting to jurisdiction in Ecuador; it should have simply dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.'55 Moreover, unlike
an FNC dismissal, which does not allow a court in most Latin
American countries to then accept jurisdiction, a finding by a U.S.
court that it has no jurisdiction may avoid that problem.
Comity and Choice of Law
The fault of the misapplication of FNC in international litigation lies with the courts rather than with corporations and their
lawyers. Given the state of FNC jurisprudence, it has been argued
that an attorney representing a corporate defendant in international litigation would be guilty of malpractice not to move for
FNC. "' 6 The recent developments in the cases from Nicaragua and
Ecuador may allow lawyers defending the corporations to re-evaluate such a knee-jerk reliance on FNC. A defendant's resort to
FNC is an attempt to choose the law of the foreign country and to
avoid U.S. law. Outside of an agreement by contract, the choice of
law is an issue of law for the court. 5 ' Corporate defendants, however, are at least half-right in thinking that foreign law should
3.

become a very general principle, that suits in rem should be brought, where the
property is situated and this principle is applied with almost universal approbation in
regard to immoveable property.").
152. Id. § 554, at 466-67 ("[By the common law... real actions must be brought in
the forum re sitae; and mixed actions are properly referable to the same jurisdiction.
Among the latter are actions for trespasses and injuries to real property, which are
deemed local; so that they will not lie elsewhere than in the place rei sitae.") (footnote
omitted).
153. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 10, at 295-97.
154. See STORY, supra note 122, § 554, at 466-67.
155. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947) ("[T]he doctrine of forum
non conveniens can never apply if there is absence ofjurisdiction."); Sinochem Int'l Co.
Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 436 (2007) ("When subject matter
or personal jurisdiction is difficult to determine, and the district court determines
that forum non conveniens is appropriate, the district court has discretion to dismiss
for FNC without first resolving the jurisdictional issues.").
156. See Peter Prince, Bhopal, Bougainville and Ok Tedi: Why Australia'sForum
Non Conveniens Approach is Better, 47 Irr'L & Coup. L.Q. 573, 588 (1998).
157. See Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter Group, 994 F.2d 996, 1000 (1993). Even
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apply. Foreign law, tied to the place of the tortuous injury, should
be the law that a U.S. court should be bound to apply as a matter
of conflicts law.
While both plaintiffs and defendants attempt to choose the
desired law through forum shopping and FNC, there is a growing
recognition that some areas of law require internationally uniform
choice of law rules.1, 8 Until the mid-twentieth century, the nearly
uniform conflicts law for torts in the United States was that the
substantive law of the place of the injury governed, i.e. the lex loci
rule.'59 Such was the traditional common law rule. 6 ' The traditional lex loci rule for torts produced certainty and ease of application. 6 ' Under the influence of the criticism from conflicts
theorists, courts that have considered the rule in recent years
have rejected it as an exclusive rule.'62 While the lex loci rule has
not been completely displaced, the current situation is that in
torts the so-called modern conflicts approaches have been applied
by the courts in a way described as "eclectic." 63 This means uncertainty as to what law will govern and places an emphasis on
forum shopping in order to obtain the desired law. According to
empirical studies, "the modern approaches all showed a statistically significant propensity to favor recovery [for the] local litigants [because of the] forum law more often than the traditional
approach.""
One of the attractions of U.S. courts for foreign litigants lies
with the rules of procedure, which includes broader discovery than
what is otherwise permitted in foreign jurisdictions. 65 That the
procedural rules of the forum apply is not a new development.
According to traditional conflicts rules, it is "universally admitted
1 66
and established" that the procedural rules of the forum apply.
If in international litigation FNC were to be limited as suggested and U.S. courts uniformly applied the traditional choice of
law rule for torts of lex loci, plaintiffs would gain what they claim
they want - U.S. jurisdiction - but lose what they really want when there is a choice of law clause in a contract, a court may not honor it in special
situations, such as involving a foreign bankruptcy proceeding.
158. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 10, at 110-18, 222-31.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 713.
STORY, supra note 122, § 558, at 493-94.
See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 10, at 720.
Id.
Id. at 712.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Dahl, supra note 13, at 37-38.
STORY, supra note 122, § 556, at 468.
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U.S. law on punitive damages. The foreign plaintiff would be able
to sue in an U.S. court at the domicile of the defendant and
thereby have the benefit of the local procedures, including broader
discovery. Regardless of that court's location, the substantive law
of the place of injury would govern the plaintiffs claim."' The
plaintiff would not be able to have the court apply substantive
U.S. tort law. The defendant would benefit from application of the
law of the place where the tort occurred. 6 s Given that most other
countries do not provide for punitive damages, the plaintiff would
not be able to collect them in a U.S. court. 69 The parent corporation would be subject to personal jurisdiction in a court where it is
domiciled and plaintiffs claims against the parent would likely be
dismissed if it had operated in the foreign country only through a
subsidiary.170
These suggestions would change the litigation landscape as
follows. Plaintiffs would be permitted to, and defendant corporations would be required to, litigate in the United States. Without
liability for the parent or the possibility of punitive damages,
plaintiffs - dependant as they are on contingency-fee lawyers would find suing U.S. corporations in the United States much less
viable. U.S. courts would have a clear choice of law rule, thus
eliminating one of the motives to use FNC; but they would have to
delve into the substantive law of the foreign country, which they
would prefer to avoid doing. Foreign governments would no longer
have any legitimate basis for protesting unequal treatment of
their nationals as U.S. courts accepted jurisdiction and applied
uniform conflicts principles closer to those they follow and to
international principles based around sovereignty.
167. On the Erie-Klaxon rule, federal courts apply the choice-of-law rules of the
state in which the federal court sits, see infra Part III(A).
168. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 705-10 (2004) (discussing the
traditional lex loci rule in torts) ("For a plaintiff injured in a foreign country, then, the
presumptive choice in American courts under the traditional rule would have been to
apply foreign law to determine the tortfeasor's liability."); FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (proof of
foreign law is a question of law for the court). See also MCCAFFREY & MAN, supra note
35, at 584-85 (noting that under the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to
Products Liability, which neither the United States nor any Latin American country
has signed, the default rule, which is "the place of injury," is in accord); SCOLES, supra
note 10, at 543-556 (establishing that foreign law must be proved as a fact, unless it is
permissible to establish it by judicial notice or pursuant to an applicable statute or
rule).
169. See infra note 235.
170. See supra text accompanying note 103 (jurisdiction based on minimum
contacts).
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THE CHOICE: LITIGATING TORT CLAIMS OR ENFORCING
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN UNITED STATES COURTS

Thus far, this article has considered inter-American tort litigation in terms of Latin American plaintiffs exporting to U.S.
courts either claims for litigation or judgments for enforcement.
United States courts and, thus far, U.S. corporations have blocked
importation of most of the litigation. U.S. corporations also hope
to block imported judgments. Courts, burdened by litigation but
not so much by judgment enforcement, may decide that "justice"
requires "respect" for judgments from "beyond our borders."' 1
The politicization of the judicial process in Nicaragua and
Ecuador undermines respect for judgments from those countries.
In general, should U.S. courts enforce judgments from other Latin
American countries, or elsewhere in the world? The trend among
U.S. courts has clearly been to liberalize enforcement of foreign
judgments,"2 despite the fact that such comity is not reciprocated
from many countries, including those of Latin America. It certainly seems incongruous that the states are able to afford a privilege to foreign nationals that Americans enjoy by virtue of the
U.S. Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause and that would
normally be a matter of negotiations among nations to be settled
possibly by treaty. In terms of foreign affairs, a sounder basis for
recognition of at least some of the judgments, as well as a counterargument to the use of FNC, would be language in many of the
bilateral treaties the U.S. has entered into with other nations.7 3
The State Department has failed in its efforts for a multilateral
treaty and neither Congress nor the Supreme Court have
addressed the problem. Meanwhile, the lower federal courts have
generally allowed state law to govern the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.'74
Until the present, few tort cases litigated abroad against U.S.
corporate defendants (whether initiated there or after an FNC dismissal in the U.S.) have resulted in a significant foreign judgment
that was then brought to the United States for enforcement. Prior
to the foreign judgments against Dole and Dow and the one antici171. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 10, at 499. FNC is attractive to courts because
they avoid difficult choice of law questions and the possibility of applying unfamiliar
foreign law.
172. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 10, at 1311-15.

173. See Dahl, supra note 13, at 30-31.
174. See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks v. S. Diamond Assocs., 44 F.3d 925,
930 (11th Cir. 1995) (applying state law to questions of judicial estoppel in a diversity
action).
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pated against Chevron, it may not have been apparent that the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments can raise questions of foreign relations. The laws of Nicaragua, Ecuador, and
other countries that retaliate against the U.S. federal and state
judiciaries should cause some re-thinking of the effect of international litigation on foreign relations. Nicaragua and Ecuador are
provocatively projecting their own domestic legislation beyond
their borders and against the U.S. Their actions pose a foreign
relations problem that concerned the Framers, who believed that
the states might violate the substantive rights of foreign litigants.
The Framers granted federal courts alien jurisdiction in order to
guard against such injustices.'7 5 Federal courts can and should
protect the rights of all litigants against the extra-territorial
impact of unjust legislation originating from either states in the
U.S. or foreign states by applying traditional sovereignty-based
rules of jurisdiction and choice of law to govern international
litigation.
Other countries have the sovereign right to regulate the
actions of U.S. and other foreign corporations within their borders, as a number of Latin American countries have done under
the "Calvo Doctrine."1 7 6 Those countries may dislike the fact that
U.S. corporations doing business abroad likely have few, if any,
assets in the foreign country. The parent corporation probably
does not even have a presence, much less assets in the country. Its
in-country subsidiary may or may not have any assets by the time
of the litigation but, in any event, would have limited the exposure
of its assets relative to the perceived risks of operating in the foreign country. As a matter of national sovereignty (as opposed to
moral right), a nation-state has the power to regulate extensively,
175. See supra text accompanying notes 133-34.
176. For an early in-depth study of the Calvo Doctrine, see the seminal work by
DONALD R. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE: A PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERICAN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAw AND DIPLOMACY (1955). On the interplay of the Calvo Doctrine
and FNC, see Figueroa, supra note 24, at 127-29. Wenhua Shan, From "North-South
Divide" to "Private-PublicDebate": Revival of the Calvo Doctrine and the Changing
Landscape in International Investment Law, 27 Nw. J. IN'L L. & Bus. 631, 632
(2007). "[The Calvo Doctrine] essentially asserts 'two concepts of non-intervention and
absolute equality of foreigners with nationals,' with emphasis placed on the rejection
of the superiority or imperial prerogatives of powerful states and their nationals. The
Doctrine can be further broken into three key elements, namely an 'anti-supernational-treatment' standard, exclusive local jurisdiction, and the exclusion of
diplomatic protection. The Latin American states 'enthusiastically received' this
doctrine and implemented it in their constitutions, domestic legislation, international

treaties and contracts signed between foreign investors and Latin American
governments, even though its validity was denied in Europe and North America."
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or even to nationalize, foreign corporations.1 77 Of course, such
actions will discourage or drive away foreign investment. While
the loss of foreign investment may not prompt some countries to
correct internal injustices, those regimes should not expect the
U.S. or other nations to respect court judgments from a country
which regularly denies due process to foreign businesses.
For its part, United States courts have pursued the policies of
FNC and liberal recognition of foreign judgments, which have
inverted the traditional framework for international litigation.
Application of FNC, which has fueled the inter-American conflict
over (mostly) product-liability litigation, is inconsistent with
traditional principles of jurisdiction and comity. That does not justify the retaliation by Nicaragua and Ecuador through discriminatory laws and court proceedings. Nevertheless, as a result, U.S.
courts are facing attempts to enforce questionable foreign judgments. While pleas to resolve the conflict over FNC coming from a
Latin American perspective1 78 have had little if any effect, the litigation over the recognition and enforcement of politically corrupt
judgments from Nicaragua and Ecuador should cause U.S. courts
to consider the relationship between FNC and judgments from
these countries. A comprehensive review would consider that 1.)
state, rather than federal, law largely controls the recognition of
foreign judgments even though such matters implicate foreign
affairs; and 2.) the model law regarding enforcement of foreign
judgments, adopted by many states, fails adequately to protect the
national interest vis-A-vis the courts of other countries. 79
A.

Erie and Klaxon Need Not Extend to the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins8 ° held that federal courts sitting in diversity cases must apply state law, whether created by a
177. Bilateral investment treaties usually provide for protection against
nationalization and arbitration over disputes between the investor and the
government. See LuKE ERIC PETERSON, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND
DEVELOPMENT POLICY-MAKING (2004), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/trade

bits.pdf.
178. See, e.g., Figueroa, supra note 24, at 123-25.
179. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 10, at 1267 ("A unification of the applicable rules by
the U.S. Supreme Court, in the exercise of the federal foreign-commerce or foreignrelations powers, however, would be preferable to the present state of the law ... Ithe
approach of leaving this problem to be decided by the states as part of their common
law development, with their solutions to be applied by the federal courts under Erie
and Klaxon, is anomalous.").
180. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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state's legislature or its courts. Erie overturned the well-established doctrine announced by Justice Story in Swift v. Tyson'
that in diversity cases involving commercial law federal courts
apply principles of the common law in the absence of a state statute to the contrary. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc"s2
extended Erie to domestic conflicts law.
Whatever justification the Erie-Klaxon rule has domestically,
the logic need not and should not be extended to international litigation. The U.S. Constitution requires that federal courts have
jurisdiction over international litigation precisely to avoid potential anti-foreign bias in state courts and to apply the law of
nations, a form of international common law. At least as applied
to international litigation, the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson" 3 does
implement the Framers understanding of how the federal judiciary should function. While Erie is not likely to be overturned, the
argument for overturning Klaxon is a serious one." 4 In the
absence of a Supreme Court decision holding that Klaxon applies
to international litigation, district courts should assume that federal preemption exists.
The rationale of Erie (deference to state law) simply does not
apply when the claim arises outside of the United States. While
Erie-Klaxon has failed to limit domestic forum shopping,' its
application to international litigation only serves to increase
forum shopping. More importantly, applying state law to the
enforcement of foreign judgments can undermine U.S. foreign policy. In Osorio, for example, a federal court in Miami applied Florida law to a judgment from a case litigated in Nicaragua at a time
when it was official U.S. policy to boycott Nicaragua's courts.
Although the court rightly refused recognition of the judgment,
the idea that it was a state-law question to determine whether the
181. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
182. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
183. Swift, 41 U.S. at 1.
184. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 10, at 178-79. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's
unquestioning adherence, Klaxon seems neither constitutionally required nor
necessarily to follow from Erie as a matter of policy. Klaxon seems not to rest on the
same constitutional prohibitions, despite the Court's statement to the contrary. As a
number of commentators have shown, the ordering of relations among the States of
the Union is a uniquely federal function. The reach of state laws, albeit limited by the
loose standards of the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses, should no more
be left to the unilateral determination of the individual states than is the
determination of their physical boundaries. Authority for federal law-making in
conflicts law need not be derived from principles of "federalism" alone; it may also be
based on the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
185. See id. at 195-201.
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federal courts would support federal foreign policy is ludicrous.1 86
When presented with an appropriate case, the Supreme Court
should point to foreign relations considerations and the constitutional differences between sister-state and foreign-nation judgments in holding that Erie-Klaxon has no applicability in
international litigation.
As Justice Story explained, principles of the Conflict of Laws
derive from the "General Maxims of International Jurisprudence,"
which are based on the doctrine of sovereignty.18 7 Interestingly,
the district court opinion in Osorio, while purporting to Florida
law on the recognition of judgments, referred to international
standards of due process: "the legal regime set up by Special Law
364 and applied in this case does not comport with the 'basic fairness' that the 'international concept of due process' requires."188
B.

In the States: A Move from "Comity," to De Facto
"FullFaith and Credit"

Internationally, "there are no agreed upon principles governing recognition and enforcement and, in the absence of treaty,
courts are generally guided by notions of comity and fairness that
may vary from country to country."'8 9 "Comity," as discussed
above, is a practice originating in the law of nations whereby
courts of one jurisdiction give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation, but as a
matter of deference. Thus, foreign judgments in many states in
the United States, get treated very much as if they were sisterstate judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution. Indeed, "[tihe United States is among the countries
in the world most receptive to the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments [which] is particularly remarkable in light of
the fact that the United States is not a party to any comprehensive bilateral or multilateral treaty... [n] or has the United States
186. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
187. STORY, supra note 122, §17-38, at 19-37.
188. Osorio,665 F. Supp. 2d at 1345 ("The term due process in this context is meant
... to embody an international concept of due process, defined as a concept of fair
procedures simple and basic enough to describe the judicial processes of civilized
nations, our peers."). Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement,
art. 10.5, Aug. 5, 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/
cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-ftalfinal-text
thereinafter CAFTA]
("Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with
customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security.").
189. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 146, §3.11, at 3-30.
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enacted any federal legislation on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments."1 9
This liberalized trend in the United States pertaining to the
recognition of the enforcement of foreign judgments undermines
foreign plaintiffs seeking relief from U.S. courts. Conversely, foreign plaintiffs traditionally litigated their claims in U.S. courts.
That is no longer the case due to the use of FNC. On the other
hand, traditionally foreign judgments were not so readily recognized and enforced as they are today. How did it happen that U.S.
courts turned international litigation upside down?
Prior to the writings of Justice Story and Judge Kent in the
nineteenth century, the extent to which comity would be applied
to foreign judgments was unsettled. 91 As explained by Justice
Story, "[t]he general doctrine in the U.S. courts in relation to foreign judgments [was] that they are prima facie evidence, but they
are impeachable."19 2 The most important basis for refusing to recognize and enforce a judgment was the foreign court's lack of jurisdiction.191 Other possible bases included lack of notice to the
defendant, fraud, or given in violation of local law."' But beyond
lack of jurisdiction and fraud, the extent of impeachability was
unsettled.195 Noting that some European countries conditioned the
enforcement of foreign judgments on reciprocal treatment for its
judgments from the foreign country, Justice Story opined, "[t]his
is certainly a very reasonable rule; and may, perhaps, hereafter
into the structure of international
work itself firmly
196
jurisprudence."
In 1895, the leading Supreme Court case, Hilton v. Guyot,197
said that Justice Story's prediction had "been fulfilled, and the
rule of reciprocity has worked itself firmly into the structure of
international jurisprudence." 98 After summarizing the reciprocity
requirements in Europe, Latin America, and other countries, the
Court noted that outside of common-law countries, the enforcement of foreign judgments required reciprocity. 9 9 Therefore, the
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

MCCAFFREY & MAIN, supra note 35, at 613-14.
See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 193-96 (1895).
STORY, supra note 122, § 608, at 508.
Id. § 586, at 492, 508.
Id. § 607, at 507.

195. Id. § 608, at 508.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. § 618, at 515.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
Id. at 227.
Id.
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Court concluded that U.S. comity did not require enforcement of
foreign judgments from countries (in that case, France) that did
not extend comity to U.S. court judgments.2 00
Hilton supposedly did not bind state courts because the case
was based on diversity jurisdiction and was decided by applying
federal common law. 2 1 Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided
Erie. 2 and Klaxon 20 3 to the effect that no general federal common
law exists. Therefore, a federal court sitting in diversity must
apply the law of the state in which the federal court sits, including
its conflicts law. "As a result, a number of federal courts as well as
state courts have declined to follow Hilton and regularly accord
recognition to foreign-country judgments on essentially the same
basis as sister-state judgments."2 4
The jurisprudence regarding the enforcement of foreign judgments in U.S. courts has made a remarkable reversal without the
Supreme Court ever overturning its leading decision on the issue.
In Hilton, the Supreme Court decided that, as a matter of international and U.S. conflicts law, foreign judgments are enforced on
the basis of comity and that comity includes the element of reciprocity.20 5 Now, some lower federal courts refuse to follow this
Supreme Court case and instead follow state statutes and court
decisions which not only have dropped the reciprocity component
of comity but have also dropped or gone beyond comity by giving
foreign judgments essentially the same status that sister-state
judgments have under the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit
Clause. There is something very wrong in all of this.
The current trend can be traced to, and be reversed by, correcting two fundamentals misjudgments. First, the lower federal
courts, which disregard Hilton, have mistakenly judged that
Klaxon's holding on conflicts laws as among the states must necessarily extend to conflicts law as between the United States and
other sovereign nations.2 6 Secondly, the lower federal courts have
failed to question not only the authority of states to waive reciprocity vis-a-vis foreign nations, but also to grant foreign countries essentially the same Full Faith and Credit protection which
the Constitution gives each state by imposing reciprocity regard200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 210.
See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 10, at 1311.

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 10, at 1311.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895).
See supra SCONES ET AL., supra note 10, at 178-79.
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ing judgments among all the states of the Union. Both misjudgments ignore a fundamental pillar of the Constitution, that the
states have no role to play in foreign and international relations
between the U.S. and other nations.2 °7

1.

The Implications of Treating Foreign and Sister-State
Judgments Alike

Federal systems have an internal need both for uniform
choice of law rules and for the separate state judiciaries to respect
the judgments of each other.2 °8 Under the Articles of Confederation, which was only a league or alliance, the state courts were
supposed to treat judgments from sister-states with "full faith and
credit," but did not uniformly do so. 2"9 The Framers improved upon
this provision in the Articles of Confederation by establishing an
enforceable obligation on the states, 210 a matter of right and reciprocity under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.1 States that have
enacted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
(UFMJRA),1 2 however, have gone beyond international comity
and even the Full Faith and Credit Clause. They have done so by
giving foreign judgments essentially the same rights as those of
sister-states, but without foreign nation having the reciprocal obligations imposed on sister-states.2 13
It would be one thing if what amounts to a doctrine of comity207. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
208. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 10, at 1315-16, nn.4-5. In the European Union,
for example, there is the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.
209. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION: WITH A
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES,
BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION, §

1307 at 182-83 (Hilliard, Gray and Co.

1833).

210. See 2 THE

RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787, 447-48, 483-84, 488-

89, 601-03 (Max Farrand ed., 1934).
211. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to
the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state .. . [a]nd the
Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and
proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.").

212.

UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS

RECOGNITION ACT,

13 U.L.A. 263 (1962),

available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1920-69/ufmjra62.
htm.
213. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., No. 07-22693-CIV, 2010 WL 571806, at *1 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 12, 2010). Reciprocity was not an issue with the Florida Recognition statute
because it does provide that non-reciprocity is a possible, but not mandatory, basis for
non-recognition. Interestingly, in a petition for rehearing, Osorio argued for the first
time, inter alia, that Hilton v. Guyot and principles of comity should govern the
recognition of the Nicaraguan judgment.
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cum-reciprocity were to be dropped because either the Supreme
Court modified Hilton or Congress enacted legislation to that
effect. For states to do so on their own and for federal courts to
follow state law, however, is an unjustifiable intrusion of state law
into foreign affairs. Although states adopting UFMJRA have not
entered into a treaty with a foreign nation,214 they have acted in
response to a matter of foreign affairs with the intent of creating a
uniform U.S. law more acceptable to other nations. The reason
given for the enactment of UFMJRA was the need to satisfy
requirements for reciprocity 215 which many countries, including
those of Latin America, impose.216 Ironically, the UFMJRA itself
omitted a reciprocity requirement. Moreover, the UFMJRA failed
in its purpose of making it more likely that U.S. money judgments
would be enforced in other countries.
What difference does it really make that the states have
undertaken the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
without reciprocity? For one thing, the fact that foreign judgments
are so readily enforceable in the U.S. prompted the State Department to initiate and pursue for a number of years, ultimately
unsuccessfully, an international treaty in an attempt to have foreign governments more readily recognize U.S. judgments. 217 The
motive for the effort proved that the UFMJRA assumption that it
would produce greater recognition of U.S. judgments was mistaken. But for the state laws adopting the UFMJRA, the State
Department might not have thought it necessary to negotiate such
214. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. In drafting the UFMJRA, the Commissioners of
the Uniform State Laws must have believed that the Erie-Klaxon doctrine meant
that, as with other post-Erie model laws, a model law was necessary to achieve
national uniformity.
215. See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 263,
prefatory note (1962), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/
1920 69/ufmjra62.htm. "Judgments rendered in the United States have in many
instances been refused recognition abroad either because the foreign court was not
satisfied that local judgments would be recognized in the American jurisdiction
involved or because no certification of existence of reciprocity could be obtained from
the foreign government in countries where existence of reciprocity must be certified to
the courts by the government. Codification by a state of its rules on the recognition of
money-judgments rendered in a foreign court will make it more likely that judgments
rendered in the state will be recognized abroad."
216. Id. ("In a large number of civil law countries, grant of conclusive effect to
money-judgments from foreign courts is made dependent upon reciprocity.").
217. The Hague Conference on Private International Law began work in 1992 on a
Proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments, but the
Interim Text produced in 2001 failed to produce an agreement for a more modest
Hague Convention on Choice of Courts Agreements, which as of November 2008 had
only one signatory. See McCAFFREY & MAIN, supra note 35, at 669.
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a treaty. Also, the State Department might have been in a better
negotiating posture had U.S. states not already given away recognition without reciprocity. Interestingly, Latin American countries generally were resistant to joining the Hague Convention
due to the doctrine of FNC." s
2.

Reasons Not to Enforce Foreign Judgments: Violations
of State or Federal Policy

The UFMJRA raises issues concerning when a court cannot
and when it need not enforce a foreign judgment. A fundamental
reason for not enforcing a foreign judgment would be the foreign
court's lack of jurisdiction, either personal or subject matter. 219 As
to the discretionary basis for non-enforcement, it seems to the
authors, that in accord with Hilton most of the several grounds including fraud, insufficient notice of the suit to the defendant,
and conflict with another final and conclusive judgment - ought to
be mandatory. For the purposes of this paper, the one of importance has to do with public policy. According to the UFMJRA, the
court "need not" recognize a foreign judgment (but may) if "the
[cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based
is repugnant to the public policy of this state."22 0 A state court will
decide what violates state policy.
The twin aims of Erie and Klaxon require that a federal court
sitting in diversity must apply the state law as interpreted by the
highest court in the state. In the absence of a high court decision,
the district court must predict the way in which the highest court
in that state would come to its decision. The statute does not even
mention anti-federal policies. In following the state's jurisprudence under Erie, can the federal court even consider non-enforcement of foreign judgments contrary to federal policy? Must the
federal court somehow get to federal policy by saying that it violates state policy to violate federal policy or, as in Osorio, interna221
tional policy?
218. See OAS Report, supra note 1, at 85.
219. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).

220.

UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT,

§ 4(b)(3), 13 U.L.A. 263

(1962), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/
ufmjra62.htm.
221. Id. Besides the personal and subject-matter jurisdictional requirements, the
only other mandatory requirement for recognition under the Florida Recognition Act
is that the foreign system must have "impartial tribunals or procedures compatible
with the requirements of due process of law." See Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F.
Supp. 2d 1307, 1347, 1351 (2009). In Osorio, the district court cited the lack of
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Osorio demonstrates the contortions forced on a federal court
under Klaxon in an attempt to follow a state statute based on the
UFMJRA, which refers only to inconsistency with state policy.222
The opinion in Osorio found that the Nicaragua judgment violated
Florida public policy because it was not reached in accord with due
process, but the court spoke of international standards of due process.223 Specifically, the Nicaraguan judgment based on Special
Law 364 violated due process because it provided an irrefutable
presumption of causation, minimum damages, discriminatory
treatment of U.S. corporations, no provision for appellate review,
the "3-8-3" process, and retroactive civil liability.2 24 The court
stated that the proper legal test when considering a violation of
Florida's public policy is to look at Florida law, compare it with
Nicaraguan law, and determine whether there is a serious contradiction.2 25 The district court held that the Nicaraguan judgment
violated Florida's constitutional requirement of due process and
that enforcing the Nicaraguan judgment would undermine public
confidence in Florida's tribunals in the rule of law, the administration of justice, and the security of individual rights.226
The federal court said nothing about whether recognition of
the judgment would contradict federal public policy, i.e. the federal government's foreign policy towards Nicaragua. Florida has
no business making foreign policy determinations of its own with
respect to U.S. relations with other countries. If a court looks only
to the Florida statute, it would not consider the fact that official
U.S. policy at the time of the litigation was not to cooperate in any
way with the courts of Nicaragua.2 27 There never should have been
even the possibility that Florida law or the interpretations of its
courts could allow for the recognition and enforcement of Nicaraguan court judgments because to do so would have directly interfered with the nation's foreign policy.
By allowing states, subject only to relatively loose due process
standards, 1.) to extend judicial jurisdiction "beyond our borders,"
2.) to apply whatever law it chooses, and 3.) presumably to set the
impartial tribunals in Nicaragua and procedures not in accord with the international
law concept of due process as one ground for denying recognition of the judgment.
222. FLA. STAT. tit. VI, § 55.605(2)(c) ("An out-of-country foreign judgment need not
be recognized if ... [tihe cause of action or claim for relief on which the judgment is
based is repugnant to the public policy of this state.").
223. See Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1307.
224. Id. at 1332-43.
225. Id. at 1346.
226. Id. at 1347.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
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standards for the enforcement of foreign judgments, the federal
courts have abdicated an essential role they were given in the constitutional structure.2 28 Judging a state's jurisdiction under a due
process - rather than a federalism - standard within the United
States allows states to extend their jurisdiction in ways that violate the residual sovereignty of the others. When states extend
their jurisdiction beyond our borders, and state and federal courts
block foreign litigation through the application of FNC, it should
not be surprising if Latin American jurists view this as a manipulation of jurisdiction which disrespects the sovereignty of their
nations.2 29
IV.

CONCLUSION

Courts cannot, on a case-by-case basis, craft a complete and
coherent approach to the jurisdictional and choice of law issues
involved in international litigation. An awareness of the disruptive international consequences of departing from traditional, sovereignty-based principles of jurisdiction and choice of law,
however, might prompt courts to reconsider the application of
FNC, Erie, Klaxon, and long-arm statutes in international litigation. The problems with the current approach to international litigation in U.S. courts will become increasingly evident as courts
face more due process challenges to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
International law depends upon the principle of reciprocity.
Dismissing cases filed by foreign plaintiffs under FNC has no
reciprocating protection for foreign defendants. Other countries do
not recognize "minimum contacts" as a basis for jurisdiction and
understandably resent having their corporations subjected to suit
in U.S. courts under circumstances in which U.S. corporations
would not be subject to suit in their courts.23 ° When a U.S. plaintiff
files suit against a foreign defendant in a U.S. court, the plaintiff
gets not only the presumption in favor of his choice of court, but
can also assert extra-territorial jurisdiction based on minimum
contacts, also labeled "national contacts" within the U.S.23 ' The
use of FNC by federal and state courts to reject foreign plaintiffs,
228. See supra notes 133-34.
229. See OAS Report, supra note 1, at 69, 82-83.
230. See id. at 68.
231. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 10, at 426 (discussing a national contacts theory
suggested by the dissenters in Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 at 554 (1980)) ("The
Supreme Court's subsequent treatment of this theory has been equivocal ... [tiwice
since then, in cases involving foreign defendants, the Court has gone out of its way to
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combined with the use of state "long-arm" statutes to reach foreign defendants, can appear to non-U.S. parties to be the U.S.
judicial equivalent of "heads, I win; tails, you lose!"
The Executive branch attempted over the course of a number
of years to conclude a multilateral treaty2 32 known as the Hague
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters. 233 The State Department effort was an
attempt to benefit the U.S. in light of the fact that foreign judgments were already generally enforceable in U.S. courts. 234 The
effort failed due to differences in substantive law, procedure, and
public policies. For example, civil law countries, where punitive
damages are as a general rule not recognized, 3 5 resisted enforcing
U.S. tort judgments.
Although using a treaty to preempt state law is often understandably controversial in the U.S. for reasons of federalism, such
treaties may be necessary and legitimate for specific purposes. It
should not be necessary, however, for the State Department to
resort to a treaty in order to correct what, at least in part, is a
problem created by a domestic distortion of the U.S. Constitution's
allocation of powers. The states have created international issues
by granting near-automatic enforcement of foreign judgments,
extra-territorial use of long-arm statutes, and also the application
of FNC. Regardless of the merits of the draft Hague Convention,
the negotiators should not have had to deal with the uncertainties
point out that the national contacts theory was not before it and that it was taking no
position on it.").
232. See, for example, the description of part of the early efforts that the U.S.
devoted to the Convention, available at http://www.state.gov/www/globalllegaaffairs/whats-new.html (last visited July 31, 2010).
233. See the complete text of the Convention, available at http://www.state.gov/
www/global]legal-affairs/991030-forjudg.html (last visited July 31, 2010).
234. JOHN PEGRAM, THE HAGUE DRAFr CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW: AN INDIVIDUAL VIEW FROM NORTH AMERICA

(2001), available at http://www.aipla.org/MSTemplate.cfhn?Section=TheHague-Draft
_Convention onJurisdictionandl&Site=International and ForeignLaw2&
("The
Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=7808
impetus behind the request was to gain recognition and enforcement of U.S.
judgments in other countries. While U.S. courts generally recognize and enforce
judgments from other countries, U.S. judgments do not always receive the same
treatment abroad.").
235. Even when there is a fundamental rejection of punitive damages in civil law
jurisdictions, in continental Europe, there are hidden practices that tend to award
them. See Helmut Koziol, Punitive Damages: Admission into the Seventh Legal
Heaven or Eternal Damnation? Comparative Report and Conclusion, in PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW PERSPECTIVES

Vanessa Wilcox eds., 2009).

275, 284-89 (Helmut Koziol &
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of the domestic U.S. "minimum contacts" theory. One of the reasons the Hague Convention failed was the attempt to narrow the
basis for personal jurisdiction exercised in the U.S. 36 By exceeding
the legitimate limits of federalism and extending their jurisdiction
beyond our borders, the states have not only created an unnecessary international conflict among national courts, but have invited
preemption of state law by treaty.237
If the necessary changes are not initiated domestically, the
states may find that instead of controlling international litigation,
they are being controlled by international treaty. Under the pressures from globalization, the Executive branch may at some point
re-start the previously failed negotiations for an international
treaty on jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign judgments. In
order for the negotiations to produce a treaty, the Executive would
be pressed to agree to limits on state long-arm statutes and punitive damages. Meanwhile, liberal state recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments deprives the State Department of
negotiating power to seek reciprocity from other countries.
The other two branches of the federal government have some
ability to lessen or resolve the inter-American conflict over tort
litigation. Ideally, Congress or the Supreme Court, which created
these problems, should take steps to prevent international litigation in four ways: 1.) re-examine the way state and federal courts
use FNC; 2.) limit the use of state and federal court long-arm statutes that permit jurisdiction that extends beyond our borders; 3.)
restrict the arbitrary application of state choice of law rules; and
4.) end state and federal court reliance on state laws regarding the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
Ending or restricting FNC dismissals should allow foreign
plaintiffs to sue where the defendant is domiciled and under the
law of the place of the injury, i.e. the law of the appropriate for236. Pegram, supra note 234, at 3. "The basic idea of narrowing U.S. jurisdiction in
exchange for potentially greater enforceability of judgments is a politically difficult
bargain. That is because the jurisdiction and enforcement provisions have their
principal effect on different constituencies. Some have called it a "devil's bargain,"
because it gives up the rights of one group to benefit another."
237. See letter from U.S. Assistant Legal Adviser Kovar to the Secretary General of
the Conference, as excerpted in Arthur von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on
InternationalJurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable Worldwide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 191 (2001).
Although the U.S. State Department stated that the U.S. could not accept the draft
Hague Convention as it stood in 2000, it expressed a desire for an agreement and
recognized that that would require compromise on the part of the different legal
systems involved.
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eign country. If the Supreme Court does not at least clarify that
Klaxon should not apply to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, Congress should use its foreign commerce
power2 38 and the Full Faith and Credit Clause to legislate the
standards under which foreign judgments will be recognized and
enforced by all state and federal courts.

238. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3.

